Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation

查看全文 作　　者：WANG RuiWu1, HE JunZhou1,2, WANG YaQiang1,2, SHI Lei1,3 & LI YaoTang1,2 1 State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming 650223, China;2 School of Mathematics and Statistics, Yunnan University, Kunming 650091, China;3 Statistics and Mathematics College, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China

出　　处：《Science China(Life Sciences)》索引2010年第53卷第8期,共6页

基　　金：supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant No. 2007CB411600);the National Natural Sci-ence Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 30670272, 30770500, 10961027 and 10761010);the Yunnan Natural Science Foundation (Grant No. 2009CD104);the State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolu-tion and the West Light Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 摘　　要：Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk–Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction. 关键词：Hawk–Dove GAME evolutionarily stable STRATEGY ASYMMETRIC cooperation mixed STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM

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Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation

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