谣言实现的社会机制及对信息的治理

查看全文 作　　者：[1]李国武

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学社会学系

出　　处：《社会》索引2005年第25卷第4期,共13页

摘　　要：Rumors are a type of false information, a consequence of an asymmetrical informational structure. This paper focuses on the social mechanisms of rumor fulfilling. Rumors with important contents related to people’s personal interests win acceptance through changing people’s expected payoffs, misleading people to the belief that acceptance of the rumor would beneficially outperform rejection of it. Nevertheless, it is risky to believe rumors; therefore, people make their decision whether to believe a rumor or not by referring to other people’s choices. An analysis was performed first within a game model that incorporated the variables of an individual’s expectancy and other people’s impact to predict whether the individual would accept or reject a rumor. Another analysis followed to further examine the functions of some dynamic mechanisms in rumor fulfilling when group pressure and network effects were introduced. Finally, an exploratory discussion on how to prevent rumors and erase their effects via information management strategies was presented. 关键词：社会机制 WHETHER structure people ANOTHER further network WOULD 治理信息谣言 impact that first model group and type This with make game some when to of are WIN how via on

相关文献

参考文献（12）
引证文献（34）
耦合文献（38）

参考文献(12)

引证文献(34)

耦合文献(38)

互联网出版许可证新出网证(渝)字10号全国400电话 - 免长途话费

谣言实现的社会机制及对信息的治理

参考文献(12)

引证文献(34)

耦合文献(38)

用户提示